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Abstract
This paper evaluates the effect of a self-employment grant scheme for unemployed 
 individuals—designed to ease the first 12 months of business operation—on firm growth, 
survival, and labor market reintegration in Croatia in the 2010–2017 period. Grants offered 
a moderate amount of finances (up to 50% of average annual gross salary) and absorbed only 
5% of funds allocated to active labor market policies (ALMPs), but accounted for 10% of 
new firms opened throughout the years. We contribute to the literature on self-employment 
grants with several novel findings. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the unemploy-
ment episodes dataset, we find that individuals who finish their spell with a grant have a sig-
nificantly lower probability of returning to unemployment. The policy is particularly effective 
for individuals who would have otherwise had labor market opportunities (men, more edu-
cated, prime-age workers, previously employed), individuals who became unemployed after 
inactivity and lost their job due to a firm’s closure—which demonstrates that self-employment 
subsidies can be effective in ameliorating unemployment. However, the policy was not effec-
tive for longer unemployed individuals. At the firm level, we find descriptive evidence that 
limited liability firms opened via a grant have lower growth potential and worse survival 
profile, while unlimited liability firms—even though a sizable portion of them closes after a 
required 12-month grant period—have a more favorable survival profile. Finally, we also find 
that the effectiveness of these grants has increased throughout the years, indicating toward 
the direction of institutional learning.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is the backbone of economic growth and development, and governmental 
policies can spur but also limit entrepreneurship momentum and activities (e.g., Bornhäll 
et al., 2015; Henrekson, 2005). To design policies that facilitate entrepreneurial behavior one 
must understand the heterogeneity of different entrepreneurship motives, processes, and out-
comes, especially during an economic downturn (e.g., Peric and Vitezic, 2016). The reasoning 
behind startups is often divided into two types of motives: the push and the pull factors [for an 
overview, see Simoes et al. (2016)]. Push factors encompass poor job prospects like unemploy-
ment, limited work flexibility, or termination of unemployment benefits, which steer the deci-
sion toward self-employment, while pull factors encompass reasons such as wanting to be one’s 
boss or perceiving a business and/or lifestyle opportunity that directs an individual toward 
self-employment (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010).
The past decade, with the experience of a deep recession, has provided a plethora of push 
factors materialized as high unemployment and all of the adverse ramifications that unem-
ployment brings. Therefore, governments around the world spend considerable funds to tackle 
unemployment with traditional active labor market policies (ALMPs), such as job creation, 
training, and salary subsidies. For example, according to Eurostat, European Union (EU) 
member states spent almost 2% of their combined gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 to 
support unemployed individuals to get paid jobs.1 However, the effectiveness of these policies 
has been questioned as they yield ambiguous results [see, for example, Card et al. (2010, 2017)].
Recently, a complementary measure to the traditional ALMPs—self-employment grants 
for unemployed individuals—has become increasingly popular. These grants aim to support 
unemployed individuals to start their firms, thus “turning unemployment into employment” 
(Caliendo, 2016), and are maybe particularly interesting for underpaid individuals, as well as 
for individuals with limited employment opportunities (less educated, minorities, youths, and 
individuals with depreciated skills) [see, for example, Caliendo (2016) and Dvouletý and Lukeš 
(2016)]. Grants for self-employment are also attractive to policymakers as self-employment that 
might directly decrease unemployment and also indirectly decrease unemployment via entre-
preneurs’ potential hiring (so-called double dividend), thus giving the self-employment grant 
not only a social but also a growth role.
Previous research, mostly on developed countries, has shown that self-employment 
grants are a successful avenue of labor market integration, but that firms opened through 
 self-employment grants have lower growth potential.2 Heterogeneous effects show that they 
are most effective for individuals who would otherwise have no employment options, namely, 
less educated, younger individuals, and women (Caliendo and Künn, 2011, 2015).
However, following the arguments from Shane (2009), decreasing the entry barriers into 
entrepreneurship is not necessarily a good public policy as it decreases the quality of entrants 
(Conti and Roche, 2021; Branstetter et al., 2014). In Portugal, examining the policy reform 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/labour-market-policy/database
2 For example, analyzing firm survival Andersson and Wadensjö (2007), Désiage et al. (2010), and Caliendo (2016) 
show a significant and positive effect; while Caliendo and Künn (2011) and Wolff and Nivorozhkin (2012) also show 
positive labor market integration effects. However, Désiage et al. (2010) and Caliendo et al. (2015) found no significant 
effects of self-employment grants on employment growth, turnover growth, value-added, profitability, labor, and 
capital productivity; and Caliendo (2016) finds an indication of deadweight effect as his results suggest that 40–60% of 
subsidized firms would have been opened without the grant.
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decreasing entry barriers, Branstetter et al. (2014) find a modest positive effect on firm creation 
and firm employment, but mostly in low technology sectors. In high-technology sectors, Conti 
and Roche (2021) show that recession induces a reduction in the opportunity costs of starting 
new ventures and therefore induces pushes into entrepreneurship those individuals who are 
most likely constrained by the lack of attractive wage work prospects.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing self-employment grants for unem-
ployed individuals in Croatia in the period 2010–2017. The grant scheme was designed to ease 
the initial phase of a business startup by financing salaries, contributions, basic work equip-
ment, and training and seminars. While the amount of the grant was of moderate  magnitude—
going up to €4,750 on average in 2017—and the whole grant scheme accounted for only 5% of 
funds spent on ALMPs, >15,000 grants were awarded, which contributed up to 10% of firm 
creation within a particular year. Potential users of the measure were unemployed individuals 
registered at the public unemployment office Croatian Employment Service (CES), and who 
applied for a grant with a business plan. The public employment office evaluated the busi-
ness proposal based on the feasibility of the idea, projected output in terms of employment 
potential, and unemployment duration of an individual. If awarded the grant, an individual 
registered a business—in the form of a limited or unlimited liability firm— and had to run it 
for 12 months, after which they had to file a report on the funds used.
We estimate the effect of the grant receipt on the probability of reentering unemploy-
ment by using the universe of unemployment episodes. Exploiting the fact that the dataset 
contains multiple unemployment spells per individual, we rely on individual fixed effects to 
control unobserved heterogeneity which affects selection into the grant as well as, arguably, 
rich episode- and individual-based set of covariates. Multiple estimation models, specifica-
tions, and subsamples provide evidence that the self-employment grant significantly reduces 
the probability of reentering unemployment. Comparing the most comprehensive specification 
within a particular model with the specification using individual-fixed effects points toward 
slightly positive selection into the grant (compared with other unemployed people in the data-
set) as estimation with individual-fixed effect yields quantitatively smaller effects. Taking into 
account all of these estimates, we conclude that self-employment grants are an effective mea-
sure to combat unemployment.
Recent studies show mixed findings with regard to the long-term effects of policies like the 
one we study. Sánchez-Cañizares et al. (2020) evaluate public policy which enabled discounted 
flat rate for self-employed workers in the Autonomous Community of Andalusia (Spain) and 
find positive effects on firm survival. They find a strong positive effect in the short run, but 
a diminishing effect over a longer period, with the conclusion that in the long run the effect 
cannot be guaranteed. On the other hand, Caliendo and Tübbicke (2020) estimate the effect 
of the German startup subsidy program reform on employment prospects and earnings up to 
40 months after receiving the subsidy. They find positive effects of the new program on employ-
ment prospects and earnings in the longer term, but this effect is also stronger compared with 
previous policy design. We can track entrepreneurs’ employment for >60  months after the 
grant, and we show the effect is long-lasting, along the lines of Caliendo and Tübbicke (2020).
Furthermore, to descriptively document the effect of the self-employment grant on firm 
performance, we match the dataset on grant recipients with the universe of limited liability 
firms and find that, on average, firms opened via the self-employment grant exert lower growth 
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of sales and employment, which is line with the well-documented interpretation of necessity 
entrepreneurs. In particular, individuals receiving self-employment grants are usually without 
other employment options (compared with other entrepreneurs), so the growth potential of 
their business is limited. The survival of these firms, although based on a crude yearly indica-
tor, shows a negative significant difference compared with the no-grant counterparts.
However, matching the grant recipient dataset with the universe of unlimited liability 
firms, we can analyze the survival profile in more detail, and we find that—although a por-
tion of firms was closed after the required 12-month grant period expired, which points to 
the direction of cash and carry effect—firms opened with a grant scheme have a much more 
favorable survival profile throughout the period. While this evidence is only descriptive, as we 
do not control for the selection into the grant, the direction of bias, due to the necessity entre-
preneurial interpretation (compared with other entrepreneurs), makes these estimates a lower 
bound of the true effect. Finally, we find compelling evidence that grant scheme is becoming 
more effective throughout the years, which might come from better selection screening, bet-
ter self-selection of candidates, more business opportunities as the economy recovers, and, in 
general, from institutional learning.
While these results are somewhat in line with other literature on self-employment, we 
argue that we contribute to the literature in multiple ways. First, self-employment grant assess-
ment has been focusing on developed countries, so providing estimates for Croatia—the most 
recent EU member state, which is less developed than the European core and experienced a 
particularly deep recession with significant labor market challenges—might generalize previ-
ous results and help their external validity. Second, we use unique and, arguably, rich datasets 
that enable us to use various methods (linear and nonlinear) to document the effect descrip-
tively, but also, arguably, causally. Finally, given the socialist heritage of Croatia where the 
government was the main provider and organizer of economic activity, we also tangentially 
analyze whether governments can promote self-employment and entrepreneurial behavior in 
societies where proactive market behavior is not embedded in social norms and culture. The 
fact that we find clear evidence that there is institutional learning while administrating self-
employment grants indicates that this task is indeed feasible.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we explain the labor market context and 
self-employment grant in more detail. Section 3 covers the dataset and methods we use, as well 
as the results. Finally, the paper concludes with the Section 4.
2 Institutional setting
The Republic of Croatia, the most recent EU member state, experienced strong adverse eco-
nomic developments during the Great Recession. The recession hit Croatia in 2009 causing 
a considerable number of private firms to go bankrupt, while many of those surviving faced 
strong sales decline and overall economic hardship [for more about industry dynamics and 
firm behavior in Croatia, see Vitezić et al. (2018) and Srhoj et al. (2021)]. The cumulative drop 
of Croatia’s GDP reached 12% between 2009 and 2014, and the unemployment rate more 
than doubled (from 8.6% to 17.3%) [for more about the labor market in Croatia, see Botrić 
(2017) and Nikolic et al. (2017)]. Even after the recession, in the period 2015–2017, the GDP 
growth was rather modest, not reaching the 2008 pre-recession levels before 2017. While the 
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unfavorable external economic conditions contributed to Croatia’s economic slowdown, the 
Great Recession exposed structural problems with the Croatian economy and labor market 
(Franičević, 2011; Nestić, 2015). To ameliorate these alarming unemployment trends, the Croa-
tian government engaged in several ALMPs to tackle the unemployment concerns, notably 
vocational training for work without commencing employment (Tomić and Zilic, 2020), and 
among others, the support for unemployed individuals who wanted to start a business and get 
self-employed.
The key self-employment policy—Your initiative–your workplace—has been active since 
2010 as part of the Act on Employment Promotion.3 The main goal of the policy, admin-
istrated by the CES, has been to promote self-employment of unemployed individuals by 
easing the initial phase of a business startup—first 12 months at the market—with a lump 
sum grant. Beneficiaries of the policy are unemployed individuals registered with the pub-
lic employment office (CES) who apply for a self-employment grant.4 The applications are 
evaluated by CES based on several criteria: being unemployed, various aspects of the busi-
ness plan, including the feasibility of the business idea, the estimated number of employees, 
and the applicants’ duration of unemployment.5 If awarded the grant, which could amount 
to up to 50% of Croatian average annual gross salary, individuals are obliged to register 
their proposed business (limited or unlimited liability firm) and remain self-employed for 
12 months. After the grant period, users have to submit a report documenting the expenses 
and performance and in case of any transgressions in the form of closing the business or 
unjustifiable expenses, the user of the grant is obliged to return the funds plus the interest 
rate to CES.
The self-employment grant amount, in the period 2010–2013, could have been used exclu-
sively to cover the wage costs of a self-employed individual (beneficiaries registering a limited 
liability firm pay themselves 50% and receive the other 50% of the gross II wage costs from 
CES, unlimited liability firms received an amount that covered their full cost of contribution).6 
Since 2014, the self-employment grants have been given in line with the Commission Regula-
tion (EU) No. 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid. Beginning with the year 
2014, grants could have been used for other purposes apart from salary costs, including the 
purchase of machinery, software, materials, and resources needed for doing business, as well 
as costs of printing promotion materials, web site development, business premises rental, and 
training related to conducting firm activities. Also, from 2013 onward unemployed individu-
als could jointly open an unlimited or limited liability firm. In this way one firm could receive 
several grants, i.e., a grant for each previously unemployed individual, now entrepreneur, in the 
new firm. The policy was completely funded from the national budget in the 2010–2014 period, 
while it was co-funded by the EU from 2015 onward.
3 The measure for financially supporting self-employment out of unemployment is firstly noted in the Act for Employment 
Promotion 2009/2010. The funds for this measure were allocated from the national budget–division 05025, program 
1671, activity A689027.
4 The grant was not available for previous users of ALPMs for self-employment.
5 A five-member committee of each regional CES office makes a joint assessment of each application. In 2016, an 
assessment form was introduced with 10 areas graded by each committee member based on each of these elements, with 
the final decision being based on the average overall grade.
6 The awarded funds could be used for wages and contributions, basic work equipment and education, training, and 
seminars.
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There are several insights given in Table 1, which shows descriptive statistics on awarded 
grants. First, the average amount of the grant is of a moderate magnitude. For example, in 2016 
the average amount was €3,415, which is around 4.3 average net salary in Croatia at the time.7 
Second, even if the amount was not high, the number of grants was considerable (16,574 in the 
period 2010–2017). For example, 2,173 grants were available in 2016 compared with the total 
of 30,989 newly registered limited and unlimited liability firms in 2016, which implies that 
potentially 7% of newly registered businesses were supported through the self-employment 
grant.8 Third, there is an increase in the number of grants awarded and the total amount of 
the grant in the year when Croatia entered the EU, which coincides with the year of local elec-
tions in Croatia (2013). From 2012 to 2013, the number of grants increased from 838 to 4,409 
(526%), while the total amount increased from €2.2 million to €9.1 million (420%). Finally, the 
total value of grants subsidizing self-employment in the period 2010–2017 is €53.6 million. For 
example, in 2016, grants subsidizing self-employment accounted for 5% of the funds spent on 
ALMPs in Croatia. Existing CES evaluation (HZZ, 2016, p. 42) suggests a strong and positive 
effect of 38–46 percentage points of self-employment grants on the employment status.
Finally, when registering a business in the Republic of Croatia, individuals decide between 
two main options—a limited liability firm and an unlimited liability firm (craft). If an unlim-
ited liability firm (craft) is opened, an entrepreneur operates as a private individual and is legally 
responsible for the craft’s potential unpaid costs toward suppliers or unpaid taxes with his/her 
real estates, movable property, or his/her future wage at a new job. While opening an unlimited 
liability firm does seem risky, in 2017 about 39.5% of all firms in Croatia were crafts (HOK, 2017). 
There are several reasons why opening a craft is a desirable option. First, there are lower costs 
and it is faster to register and close a craft. Second, there is considerably lower taxation if annual 
revenue is less than approximately €20,000 (until 2015) and €40,000 (since 2015). Third, there is 
7 Comparing the grant amount to unemployment benefits can indicate whether potential moral hazard motives into 
self-employment grants are possible. For example, in 2017, a person with 10 years of work experience could receive 
unemployment benefits of total value between (roughly) €2,600 and €4,150 a year, depending on the previous wage 
(http://www.hzz.hr/default.aspx?id=10292), while the mean grant amount in 2017 was €4,749.
8 During the 2010–2017 period a total of 11,132 unlimited liability firms received self-employment grants, with a mean 
amount of €3,039. In the same period, 4,995 limited liability firms received on average €3,140.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics on self-employment grants (in €)
Year # Grants #New unlim. 
liab. firms










2010 282 6,539 19,074 4,061 3,983 491 1,145,272
2011 770 7,532 19,947 3,851 3,876 744 2,965,571
2012 838 7,372 19,984 2,614 2,467 304 2,190,132
2013 4,409 9,641 30,416 2,074 1,930 1,175 9,145,960
2014 2,938 7,816 22,168 3,321 3,263 1,038 9,757,121
2015 2,649 7,235 21,119 3,398 3,274 643 9,000,336
2016 2,162 7,652 23,337 3,415 3,308 809 7,384,163
2017 2,526 9,905 6,060* 4,749 4,658 1,269 11,995,409
Note: CES grants, unlimited and limited liability firms database. The monetary units are converted to Euros from 
Croatian Kuna based on the medium exchange rate on the last day of a particular year given by the Croatian 
National Bank. The period 2009–2014 was a period of recession in the Republic of Croatia.
*The firm-level database is truncated with March 29, 2017.
CES, Croatian Employment Service.
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simpler financial reporting regulated by the Income Tax Act (OG 177/2004). On the other hand, 
if an entrepreneur expects an income larger than the legally set threshold,  registering a craft 
would not be the optimal solution due to higher taxation ( Budimir and Aralica, 2013).
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
In order to document the effect of self-employment grants on labor market integration, we use 
a dataset on the universe of all unemployment episodes which covers all spells starting from 
January 1, 2009, until November 23, 2017 (N = 2,637,860). These data include the ID of an indi-
vidual in the episode, as well as personal characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.), informa-
tion regarding the episode (start and end dates of the episode, reason for entering and leaving 
unemployment, NACE industry codes of the previous employer and the next one, if applicable, 
etc.). Most importantly, it also includes an indicator of whether an episode ended with a self-
employment grant, as well as grant start and end dates. As we observe individuals and their 
unemployment episodes through time, we can control for the selection into self-employment 
grant using the within-individual variation, and arguably, come closer to an empirical ideal–
causal estimate. Note, however, that this identification strategy relies on an untestable (at least 
in this setting) assumption that individuals’ entrepreneurial propensity is time-invariant, 
which might not be the case.
In addition, we also use the universe of all limited liability firms in Croatia across the 
1993–2017 period (N = 1,908,831) containing firm ID, NACE industry codes, county of head-
quarters, year of incorporation and exit, complete balance sheets, and profit and loss state-
ments; and the universe of all unlimited liability firms in Croatia from October 8, 1991, to May 
26, 2018 (N = 306,059); including the dates of incorporation and dates of exit, NACE industry 
codes, and a firm’s headquarters county.9
Using the unlimited liability firms (crafts), since information on the exact dates of firm 
opening and closure is available, we provide a detailed account of the firm’s survival. We com-
plement this analysis with the effect of grants on the newly founded firm’s performance in 
terms of employment and sales growth using a limited liability firm database. It should be 
noted that the analysis of firm survival and growth is a descriptive one, as we are not able to 
control for the selection into the grant.
3.2 Individual unemployment reentry
We use data on unemployment spells to analyze the pattern of employment integration, i.e., to 
determine whether individuals who exit the unemployment via self-employment grant tend to 
stay longer out of unemployment. While the ideal setting would be the one in which we have 
access to employment data, the unemployment episodes dataset we use does not track indi-
viduals once they are out of unemployment. One of the key components of these data is that 
we observe an individual ID in an episode, which means that we potentially observe multiple 
9 We merge these datasets with grant recipients published by Croatian employment service (available at http://www.hzz.
hr/default.aspx?id=19186).
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spells per individual, so we can construct unemployment reentry variables, but also base our 
identification strategy on fixed-effects estimation. From the universe of all unemployment epi-
sodes starting from January 1, 2009, until November 23, 2017, we exclude all unfinished spells 
as we model individual reentry into unemployment—this reduces the sample from 2,637,860 
to 2,463,498 observations. Also, we exclude all unemployment episodes that did not finish in 
employment, which additionally reduces the sample to 1,529,671 observations (episodes) and 
735,273 distinct individuals (and 15,129 treated episodes).10
In addition to this, to compare self-employment grant holders with individuals who were 
also entrepreneurs at some point and, therefore, define a better comparison group, we keep all 
unemployment episodes of individuals who exited unemployment because they opened a firm 
in any of the episodes—we refer to this as an entrepreneurial sample (number of appearances 
in the entrepreneurial sample is presented in the Appendix – Figure A1).11 This reduces the 
dataset to 49,216 episodes and 29,226 individuals, 14,083 of which are treated. Table 2 displays 
the descriptive statistics of both of these datasets, while Figure 1 shows Kaplan–Meier survival 
estimates (Kaplan and Meier, 1958) for the entrepreneurial sample, where the dependent vari-
able is time to reentering unemployment. Kaplan–Meier survival estimates for the full sample 
is available in the Appendix in Figure A2.
Comparative survival profile indicates a strong positive effect of grants, and, while there 
is, to some extent, cash and carry effect as a portion of individuals returns to the unemploy-
ment office as soon as the required 1-year time frame expires, very high survival rates of not 
returning to unemployment in the first year contrast the sharp decline in survival probability 
of unemployment episodes not ending with a self-employment grant.
We can see that there are some observable differences in sample composition which might 
affect the Kaplan–Meier survival results (Table 2). In particular, among individuals who fin-
ished their unemployment episode with a self-employment grant, there is, on average, a dis-
proportionate number of men, they are middle-aged (from 30  years to 50  years) and more 
educated. Also, they most likely spend up to a year at the employment office before getting a 
grant and 70% of them were employed before the unemployment spell, while a disproportionate 
number of them also came from inactivity. If they had been previously employed, most grant 
receivers lost their jobs because their contract expired or they were laid off due to economic, 
technological, and organizational reasons. Finally, almost 60% of grant receivers opened an 
unlimited liability firm (or slightly more in the entrepreneurial sample),12 and, as expected, 
they have a lower probability of returning to unemployment with a longer period before reen-
tering unemployment.
To estimate the effect associated with the grant, we build our empirical strategy on the 
longitudinal nature of the dataset where we can observe an individual in different unemploy-
ment episodes, which enables us to eliminate the effect of fixed unobserved characteristics 
that might drive the results. Therefore, using repeated observations on treated individuals we 
arguably ameliorate concerns for selection into the grant, estimating the effect of receiving a 
10 We also exclude unemployment episodes finishing in vocational education without employment as this is a one-year 
ALMP (in total 82,473 episodes). For more details see Tomić and Zilic (2020).
11 Note that this only changes the composition of the control group; we also present results using the full sample in the 
Appendix—conclusions are identical but greater in magnitude.
12 There is a portion of grant receivers who are coded for finding a job in a country, and while this should be viewed as a 
problem in the dataset, in the entrepreneurial sample, by definition, a portion of these individuals is almost zero.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of unemployment spells which ended in employment
Full sample Entrepreneurial sample
Grant No grant Grant No grant
Individual-level variables M SD M SD M SD M SD
Female 0.426 0.494 0.523 0.499 0.428 0.495 0.458 0.498
Age (years)
≤20 0.027 0.163 0.104 0.305 0.027 0.163 0.051 0.221
20–30 0.305 0.46 0.386 0.487 0.302 0.459 0.354 0.478
30–40 0.376 0.484 0.236 0.425 0.377 0.485 0.315 0.464
40–50 0.203 0.402 0.173 0.378 0.204 0.403 0.192 0.394
≥50 0.089 0.284 0.101 0.302 0.089 0.285 0.088 0.283
Education
Elementary or less 0.057 0.232 0.152 0.359 0.058 0.233 0.088 0.284
High school 0.685 0.464 0.671 0.47 0.688 0.463 0.708 0.455
University or more 0.258 0.437 0.177 0.382 0.254 0.435 0.204 0.403
Tenure
≤2 years 0.098 0.297 0.179 0.383 0.097 0.296 0.128 0.334
2–5 years 0.108 0.311 0.134 0.34 0.107 0.309 0.131 0.337
5–10 years 0.206 0.404 0.179 0.383 0.204 0.403 0.211 0.408
10–20 years 0.365 0.482 0.237 0.425 0.369 0.483 0.315 0.465
≥20 years 0.14 0.347 0.155 0.362 0.142 0.349 0.135 0.342
Unemployment episode variables Duration of unemployment episode
≤30 days 0.016 0.126 0.108 0.31 0.016 0.125 0.092 0.289
30–90 days 0.223 0.416 0.252 0.434 0.224 0.417 0.247 0.431
90–180 days 0.294 0.456 0.254 0.435 0.3 0.458 0.263 0.44
180 days–1 year 0.245 0.43 0.228 0.42 0.243 0.429 0.235 0.424
1–2 years 0.146 0.353 0.102 0.302 0.143 0.35 0.11 0.313
2–3 years 0.043 0.203 0.031 0.173 0.043 0.203 0.032 0.175
≥3 years 0.032 0.176 0.025 0.158 0.032 0.175 0.021 0.145
Status before unemployment
Employment 0.702 0.457 0.757 0.429 0.704 0.456 0.763 0.425
Education 0.036 0.185 0.083 0.275 0.034 0.182 0.047 0.211
Inactivity 0.241 0.428 0.128 0.334 0.239 0.427 0.17 0.376
Vocational training 0.008 0.092 0.02 0.138 0.009 0.092 0.008 0.09
Other 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.112 0.013 0.115 0.012 0.108
Employment exit reason
Not applicable 0.299 0.458 0.245 0.43 0.296 0.457 0.239 0.426
Expiration of contract 0.226 0.418 0.446 0.497 0.225 0.418 0.309 0.462
Expiration of seasonal contract 0.012 0.11 0.068 0.251 0.012 0.11 0.044 0.205
Dismissal (econ., tech., and org. 
reasons)
0.309 0.462 0.16 0.367 0.311 0.463 0.272 0.445
Dismissal 0.022 0.147 0.012 0.107 0.023 0.149 0.018 0.133
Worker resigned 0.03 0.171 0.016 0.125 0.03 0.171 0.017 0.131
Consensual resignation 0.085 0.279 0.043 0.203 0.084 0.278 0.054 0.227
Firm closure 0.015 0.121 0.009 0.097 0.016 0.124 0.043 0.203
Other 0.003 0.054 0.002 0.043 0.003 0.056 0.003 0.051
(Continued)
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self-employment grant on unemployment reentry. We estimate linear and non-linear models 
that accommodate for the right censoring of the employment duration—linear version of our 
estimation takes the form:
yje = α + βgrante + γ΄Xj + δ΄Ze + ξ je + εje (1)
where yje is an indicator taking the value of one if a person j exiting an unemployment episode 
e stays out of unemployment for a certain period (6, 12, 18, 24, and 36 months), grante is an 
indicator if an unemployment episode e finished with self-employment grant, Ze is a vector 
of episode-specific controls (duration of the episode, reason for unemployment entry, reason 
for unemployment exit, reason for employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, year of 
 unemployment entry and year of unemployment exit, all dummies discretized according to 
Full sample Entrepreneurial sample
Grant No grant Grant No grant
Individual-level variables M SD M SD M SD M SD
Unemployment exit reason
Job in-country 0.069 0.254 0.953 0.211 0.001 0.025 0.532 0.499
Job abroad 0 0 0.017 0.128 0 0 0.007 0.085
Opening of limited liability firm 0.337 0.473 0.003 0.056 0.362 0.481 0.135 0.341
Opening of unlimited liability firm 0.593 0.491 0.007 0.084 0.637 0.481 0.31 0.462
Other 0 0.016 0.02 0.139 0 0 0.016 0.126
Individual-based spell variables
Unemployment reentry 0.129 0.336 0.661 0.473 0.13 0.336 0.602 0.489
Days to unemployment reentry 976.68 621.54 555.73 681.740 962.59 612.40 699.48 718.49
Sample size 15,129 1,514,542 14,086 35,125
Note: Full sample consists of all unemployment episodes from January 1, 2009, until November 23, 2017, and fin-
ished in employment. The entrepreneurial sample is a subset of the full sample containing all episodes of individu-
als who exited unemployment due to entrepreneurial reasons at least once. Year of entry and exit, NACE sectors of 
entry are omitted for brevity reasons.
Table 2 Continued
Figure 1 Kaplan–Meier estimate of employment survival.
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Table 2), Xj is a vector of individual-specific variables (gender, age, education, tenure, all dis-
cretized according to Table 2; we use only time-variant if we also use individual fixed effects), 
while ξ is an individual fixed effect that captures fixed intrinsic characteristics which might 
affect entrepreneurial motives [see, for example, Caliendo et al. (2014)]. We compare these 
estimates with estimates obtained by matching algorithms in a cross-sectional setting that is 
standard in the literature (Caliendo and Künn, 2015; Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Dvouletý and 
Lukeš, 2016). In conducting nearest neighbor matching with replacement, we use the same 
covariates as in Eq. (1) and then estimate the average treatment effect on the treated defined as 
the difference in outcomes between treated and control group in the post-treatment period.13
In order to fully accommodate the right-censoring of the data and estimate the differences 
in survival, we use the Cox proportional hazard model [see, for example, Cox (1972) and Cox 
and Oakes (1984)]. In particular, we estimate:
lje(r|grant,X,Z) = l0(r)exp{θgrante + γ΄Xj + δ΄Ze} (2)
where r is the duration in days to individual unemployment reentry, while grante, Xj, and Ze 
represent the same variables as in equation1, while the l0(r) is unrestricted baseline hazard. The 
parameter of interest is θ which measures the change in probability of unemployment reentry 
at a specific time (measured in days) associated with the receiving self-employment grant, and 
the corresponding hazard ratio (exp(θ)).
Apart from the Cox proportional hazard model, we also estimate the Weibull parametric 
survival model and the Cox mixed-effects model (Allison, 2010). While the first two methods 
do not exploit the fact that the dataset is constructed on the repeated entries of individuals, the 
Cox-mixed effect model estimates baseline hazard for unemployment reentry for every indi-
vidual and then estimates the multiplicative part based on the covariates. These three models, 
one fully parametric (Weibull), one semiparametric with unrestricted common baseline haz-
ard (Cox PH), and one semi-parametric with unrestricted baseline hazard function separate 
for every individual (COX ME) serve as an embedded robustness check to one another.
All of the results presented in Table 3 indicate a clear significant positive effect of self-
employment grants on the probability of staying out of the unemployment in a certain time 
frame. We also compare these estimates with results obtained with nearest neighbor matching 
(Table A2 in Appendix). We find nearest neighbors based on a propensity score and show an 
overlap of propensity scores in Figure A3 in Appendix showing a good overlap.14 The average 
treatment effect on the treated shows a similar but slightly higher positive effect as opposed to 
linear model 3, and given that complete conditional exogeneity is difficult to argue we continue 
with specifications exploiting the longitudinal nature of our dataset. For example, estimation 
including individual fixed-effects (Table 3) shows that individuals who finished their unem-
ployment episodes with grant have 6.4 percentage points higher probability of staying out of 
unemployment 18 months after the grant receipt than no-grant individuals, which constitutes 
11.1% of the sample mean.
Comparing specifications within the sample and the same outcome, we see that includ-
ing individual-based covariates does not change the magnitude of the effect dramatically 
13 We also try the nearest neighbor matching with 2, 3, and 4 neighbors, Mahalanobis, radius, and kernel matching. For 
brevity, we show the nearest neighbor matching with 1 neighbor and we make other results obtainable upon request.
14 For brevity we make balance tests before and after matching obtainable upon request.
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(Columns 1 vs. 2 of Table 3), but including episode-based covariates does significantly reduce 
the magnitude of the effect, implying that situation before the episode is more important in 
explaining the selection into self-employment grant than the individual-level variables.
Comparing Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3—estimations with and without individual fixed 
effects—offers insights into the selection for the self-employment grant based on the unobserv-
able. As the control group is based on individuals who were entrepreneurs at least once in the 
dataset, the fact that the fixed-effects estimation is quantitatively higher than the estimation 
without fixed effects is not surprising. Intuitively, if we compare grant recipients with unem-
ployed individuals who became employed and were entrepreneurs at some point, they tend 
to be slightly less able to stay out of unemployment. 15 As a robustness check, we also estimate 
same specifications but on the sample of unemployment episodes including only individuals 
with at least two occurrences in the sample. The results, presented in Appendix in the Table A3 
corroborate our baseline conclusions.
The results of the estimation of survival models presented in Table 4 offer similar evi-
dence regarding the effectiveness of self-employment grants. All estimation approaches indi-
cate that receiving a grant is linked to an improvement in the probability of not returning to 
unemployment: the self-employment grant improves the chance of staying out of unemploy-
ment by around 36%. The estimates within the sample are quantitatively very similar, there-
fore no additional information, in terms of the magnitude of self-employment grant effect, 
is obtained by estimating baseline hazards for every individual. Like in the linear models, 
the entrepreneurial sample gives a smaller magnitude of effects than the full sample, due 
to the composition of the control group. While the causal evidence of the effectiveness of 
15 Note that the opposite is true if we estimate the same specification in the full sample—when compared to (non-
entrepreneurial) unemployed individuals who became employed, self-employment grant recipients tend to be slightly 
more able to stay out of unemployment (see the results on full sample in the Table A1 in the Appendix).
Table 3 Results, unemployment reentry: linear models
Entrepreneurial sample
Sample mean (1) (2) (3) (4) N
Not unemployed after
6 months 0.768 0.197*** (0.004) 0.191*** (0.004) 0.023*** (0.003) 0.020 (0.015) 48,259
12 months 0.652 0.335*** (0.004) 0.326*** (0.004) 0.066*** (0.004) 0.086*** (0.017) 45,692
18 months 0.577 0.353*** (0.005) 0.343*** (0.005) 0.052*** (0.005) 0.064*** (0.020) 43,406
24 months 0.515 0.381*** (0.005) 0.371*** (0.005) 0.057*** (0.005) 0.080*** (0.022) 40,508
36 months 0.416 0.354*** (0.006) 0.342*** (0.006) 0.020*** (0.006) 0.073*** (0.024) 34,530
Individual-based covariates No Yes Yes Yes –
Episode based covariates No No Yes Yes –
Individual fixed-effects No No No Yes –
Note: Entrepreneurial sample is a subset of a full sample containing all episodes of individuals who exited unem-
ployment due to entrepreneurial reasons at least once. Individual-based covariates are gender, age, education, 
tenure, all discretized according to Table 2. Episode-based covariates include duration of the episode, reason for 
unemployment entry, reason for unemployment exit, reason for employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, 
year of unemployment entry, and year of unemployment exit, all dummies discretized according to Table 2. Stan-
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self-employment grants is still rather scarce (Caliendo, 2016), our findings are in line with 
most of the evaluation studies (Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Wolff and Nivorozhkin, 2012; Cali-
endo and Künn, 2015), which find the positive association of receiving a grant on the prob-
ability of being employed.
3.2.1 Heterogeneous effects on unemployment reentry
To document the heterogeneous effects, we first show Kaplan–Meier survivals across a legal 
form of firms that opened via a grant (limited and unlimited liability)—Figure 2. We can see 
that limited liability is a more successful legal form in terms of survival, which is expected 
given the possibility to close the craft cheaper and faster.
Table 4 Results, unemployment reentry: survival models
Entrepreneurial sample
COX proportional hazard Parametric Weibull COX mixed effects
Coefficient hazard ratio
Survival −0.443*** 0.642 0.501*** 0.640 −0.447*** 0.640
(0.030) [0.606, 0.680] (0.033) [0.599, 0.683] (0.030) [0.603, 0.679]
Observations 49,211 49,211 49,211
Ind. covariates Yes Yes Yes
Epis. covariates Yes Yes Yes
Note: Entrepreneurial sample is a subset of a full sample containing all episodes of individuals who exited unem-
ployment due to entrepreneurial reasons at least once. All estimates include individual-based covariates—gender, 
age, education, tenure, and episode-based covariates include duration of the episode, reason for unemployment 
entry, reason for unemployment exit, reason for employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, year of unemploy-
ment entry, and year of unemployment exit, all dummies discretized according to Table 2. Parentheses contain 




Figure 2 Kaplan–Meier estimate of employment survival by legal form.
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To document heterogeneous effects in more detail, we use the Cox proportional hazard 
model16 and rerun the estimation within the categories of discrete covariates we use, control-
ling for the rest of the variables. For example, we estimate the COX PH model only for episodes 
including individuals aged ≤20, controlling for all other covariates presented in the specifica-
tions above. Table A4 in Appendix presents these results. Concentrating only on the entrepre-
neurial sample, we see that there is no great heterogeneity in terms of the significance of the 
effects as the self-employment grant significantly reduces the risk of returning to unemploy-
ment for most of the subsamples.
The self-employment grant is more effective for individuals who are 20–50 years old,17 in 
contrast to younger and older individuals. It is also more effective for men, although it is also 
rather successful for women as it reduces their probability of unemployment reentry by 38.5%. 
As for the status before unemployment, the self-employment grant is the most effective for 
people coming from inactivity into unemployment as it reduces the probability of unemploy-
ment reentry by 41.7%. While this seems like a very successful strategy of activating individu-
als, note that we cannot discard the possibility that an individual could return into inactivity 
after the grant period expires.18 The grant receipt is not effective for individuals coming into 
unemployment straight from education and vocational training, which does not imply that 
these individuals will not have long-term positive effects due to the capacity building gained 
from entrepreneurial experience (Table A4).
As for educational attainment, the grant is the most effective in terms of labor market 
reintegration for individuals who finished high school and least effective for individuals who 
finished elementary school as the highest educational achievement.19 While heterogeneous 
16 We use the COX PH model as it gives almost identical estimates as other methods, computationally is faster than the 
COX ME, and also enables clearer filtering of observations, since we do not need repeated individual entries.
17 The most successful age group is 40–50, which contrasts findings from Caliendo and Künn (2011), who found that 
individuals below the age of 30 responded the best to the grant.
18 Note that grant receivers and no-grant individuals who came from inactivity spend a similar amount of time at the 
unemployment office.
19 University graduates are also quite successful in using grant funds, which somewhat contrasts findings from Caliendo 
and Künn (2011).
Figure 3 Heterogeneous effects: education.
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point estimates of self-employment grants go in the direction of a U-shaped relationship 
between educational attainment and self-employment (Poschke, 2013), due to wide confidence 
intervals, the U-shaped heterogeneous effects of self-employment grants across educational 
level cannot be claimed. Heterogenous effects based on age and gender are presented in the 
Appendix, Figures A5 and A6, respectively.
Analyzing heterogeneous effects across employment exit reasons (if applicable) carries a 
dose of ambiguity as unemployment exit reasons are hard to differentiate (employees might 
affect the official category of resignation). Nonetheless, we record a very strong improvement in 
the survival if an individual becomes unemployed because of a firm’s closure, as the probability 
of not reentering unemployment is 63.4%, indicating that self-employment is a good career 
solution for individuals with know-how, but without a place to work.
While effects across the potential tenure give a rather balanced profile, heterogeneous 
effects across unemployment duration provide interesting insights—the longer the dura-
tion of the unemployment episode, the less effective the self-employment grant. This profile 
is even extreme, as individuals who spent little time at the unemployment office utilize the 
self-employment grant the best (a striking 74% reduction in the probability of returning to 
unemployment), which might indicate the bogus employment status.20 Nonetheless, even with 
this outlier, the linearity of the effects across unemployment duration holds, which raises a 
question regarding the effectiveness of the policy toward the individuals who spent more time 
at the unemployment office (and who should be targeted with the ALMP). In particular, in our 
entrepreneurial sample, receiving a self-employment grant does not increase the probability of 
staying out of unemployment if the grant was received at the end of the episode that was longer 
than 2 years. Several other reasons might be behind a negative relationship between unemploy-
ment duration and self-employment grant effect, including a lack of financial resources needed 
for running the business or human capital decay and skill loss (Ortego-Marti, 2016), which 
make it difficult for individuals to withstand the minimum efficiency scale on the market.
20 Individuals might resign from work, apply to the unemployment office and receive a self-employment grant, and then 
work almost exclusively for the firm they resigned from in the first place. For more on bogus employment see Thörnqvist 
(2014).
Figure 4 Heterogeneous effects: time spent at the unemployment office.
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Finally, regarding the heterogeneous effects, we further investigate two groups of 
 unemployed individuals to shed light on potential bogus self-employment (Thörnqvist, 2014) 
( Figure 5).
In particular, we define potentially bogus self-employed as a group of individuals who 
completed a university-level education and spent a short time (up to 90 days) at the unem-
ployment office. This group closer resembles the potential bogus self-employment in the gig 
economy, as individuals have higher education and short unemployment duration.21 The results 
in Figure 5 show considerably stronger positive effects among the second group, which raises 
questions regarding how large is the portion of bogus self-employment within the second 
group of publicly supported individuals? This being said, we encourage researchers to inves-
tigate the effectiveness of self-employment grants with more detailed datasets, which could 
reliably identify publicly supported bogus self-employment.
3.3 Firm survival and growth
3.3.1 Firm survival
Next, we turn to firm performance in terms of survival and growth. Our analysis in this regard 
is limited by the availability of information in two datasets: unlimited liability firms dataset, 
from which we infer survival, and limited liability dataset, from which we infer growth.
We can offer several conclusions from Kaplan–Meier estimates in Figure 6. First, we can 
observe that unlimited liability firms opened via self-employment grants have significantly 
higher survival probability than no-grant counterparts. Second, grant firms have very high 
survival in the first year, as expected, since grant agreement required that a firm must remain 
open for at least 1 year. After that, we observe a sharp decline in survival probability implying 
that firm closure after the required 1-year activity was common among grant-recipients. Nev-
ertheless, survival of firms opened with grants is consistently higher throughout the period. 
21 It would be ideal to also know whether individuals starting a new firm are continuing to work for their previous 
employer. Unfortunately, such data was not available.
Figure 5 Heterogeneous effects: potentially bogus employment.
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For example, 95.1%, 75.3%, and 66.4% of firms initiated with a self-employment grant are 
still open after 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years, respectively, while 80.1%, 67.6%, and 60.0% no-
grant firms are still operating after 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years, respectively. Note that survival 
profiles using this dataset reflect the results from unemployment episodes datasets (see, for 
example, Figure 2). Indeed, these descriptive conclusions are corroborated by the results of 
linear probability and Cox proportional hazard models—survival of unlimited liability firms 
opened via the grant is 23.8% more favorable than the no-grant counterparts (Table A5 in 
Appendix).
Apart from these baseline results, we also show the effect through time (Figure 7), where 
we can see improvement in the effectiveness of the grant every year. Similar profile of grant 
effectiveness can be seen from Kaplan-Meier survival estimates on unemployment re-entry 
across the years presented in the Appendix in Figure A4. These improvements, evident par-
ticularly during the recession period (2010–2013), can be attributed to better self-selection of 
applicants, improved screening of business ideas, more efficient controls, and, consequently, to 
institutional learning.
Summing up the results presented in the figures above, we find that unlimited liability 
firms display a sharp decline in the survival probability after 1 year, which points in the direc-
tion of the cash and carry effect [see, for example, Pfeiffer and Reize (2000)], because as soon 
as the required 1 year of operating expires a sizable portion of firms opened through a grant 
scheme closes. However, an increase in firm closures after 1 year does not necessarily imply 
an adverse effect because the grants curve does not cross the no grant curve, which is why the 
cash and carry effect cannot be confirmed, and because individuals might have reintegrated 
into a labor market differently—as we see in the part with unemployment reentry. In other 
words, we find evidence supporting a more favorable survival profile, which is in line with 
the previous empirical findings [see, for example, Andersson and Wadensjö (2007), Désiage 
et al. (2010), and Caliendo (2016)]. While our results presented in this section are descriptive in 
nature, as we disregard the issues of unobserved characteristics, which might affect both selec-
tions in self-employment grant and firm survival, bearing in mind that the self-employment 
grant is targeted at unemployed individuals, we argue that these positive survival estimates are 
Figure 6 Kaplan–Meier firm survival estimates.
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certainly not upward biased. In particular, even firms opened by necessity entrepreneurs show 
more favorable survival potential.
3.3.2 Firm growth
Limited liability firms dataset contains broad coverage of financial records for all firms from 
1993 to 2017. We construct growth measures in terms of employment and sales. While firm 
survival is also tractable, it is contained to yearly variables (whether or not a firm exists next 
year). To analyze firm growth, we restrict our analysis to newly registered firms and preclean 
the data. We drop firms with >50 employees, firms with more than half a million euro in sales 
in the year of firm registration, and firms with more than half a million euro of registered capi-
tal, as we do not consider them comparable to firms opened via the self-employment grant.22 
We are left with newly registered limited liability firms with and without the self-employment 
grant—in the period 2010–2016.23 Descriptive statistics are shown in Table A6 in Appendix.
We estimate two regressions, the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) for continuous 
outcomes and probit regression for binary outcomes. In the models, Yi is a dummy for sur-
vival, a dummy for having at least one or two employees (probit) or value of sales or number of 
employees (OLS). Our key covariate of interest is granti, which takes the value of one if the firm 
i received a self-employment grant and 0 otherwise, while Xi is a vector of firm-level covariates.
22 This leads to cleaning 874 grant non-receivers and 0 grant receivers. These firms are closer to the concept of high-
growth firms in the right side of the firm growth distribution (Vitezić et al., 2018) and are not comparable to regular 
start-ups.
23 We focus on the period 2010–2016, as the dataset does not include all balance sheets and profit and loss statements for 
the year 2017.
Figure 7 Kaplan–Meier firm survival estimates by years.
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The results shown in Table 5 convey similar messages to descriptive statistics (Table A6 
in Appendix) regarding the differences between a firm receiving a grant and regular start-
ups. Firms receiving a grant, on average, have lower sales. For example, in the first year of 
doing business firms have €9,467 lower annual sales. This negative difference in annual sales 
increases as much as four times in 2 years after registering a firm. Furthermore, firms receiving 
the grant for self-employment have on average 0.436 employees less than 1 year after the firm 
was registered, which increases to 0.579, 2 years later. Breaking down the employment patterns 
in detail, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show that grant-receiving firms have, on average, a higher 
probability of having only one employee, as the effect of a grant on having at least one employee 
is positive and significant, while the effect on having two or more employees, although insig-
nificant, is negative. Finally, we see a statistically significant negative difference in survival 
between firms receiving grants for self-employment and regular startups.
The difference in survival estimates between crafts and limited liability firms can be 
explained by tax regimes and market selection (Jovanovic, 1982). Namely, taxation is more 
favorable for entrepreneurs who start a craft and have a turnover <300,000 Kunas (approx. 
€40,000), while if an entrepreneur runs a craft above this threshold, taxation sharply increases 
and it is no longer favorable in comparison to limited liability firms. Thus, unemployed indi-
viduals start limited liability firms when they assume the turnover will be above this threshold. 
However, as elaborated by Jovanovic (1982), entrepreneurs do not know their true productivity 
level until they arrive on the market, therefore, a negative link between self-employment grants 
and firm survival might be explained with this interpretation.
Summing up the descriptive results presented in Table 5 and Table A6 in Appendix, we 
find that limited liability firms initiated via self-employment subsidy are on average smaller in 
terms of capital, sales, and employment, and exert smaller growth potential than their no-grant 
counterparts, while their survival profile is worse. These conclusions, although descriptive, 
Table 5 Regression results for limited liability firms
Employees (at least)
Sales Employment One Two Survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) N
Time horizon

































Note: Models 1 and 2 are OLS regression estimates, while Models 3–5 are marginal effects from probit regressions. 
All estimates include NACE 2-digit industry dummies, county of firm headquarters, year of firm registration, type of 
a firm’s legal form, number of months a firm was officially open during the year (all dummies), the value of capital 
owner registered, and other types of grants as covariates [used in Srhoj et al. (2021, 2019)]. Standard errors clus-
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corroborate the interpretation of necessity entrepreneurs. In particular, unemployed individu-
als wanting to start a firm are more likely to be necessity entrepreneurs as they start businesses 
due to a lack of employment opportunities, in contrast to individuals who become entre-
preneurs because of identified business opportunities (Block and Sandner, 2009). While the 
self-employment grant does serve as an ALMP and, thus, helps unemployed individuals to 
reintegrate into the labor market, firms opened with these grants have limited contribution to 
the economic growth (Shane, 2009; Caliendo, 2016), and results presented in tables above sup-
port these conclusions.
To further interpret our estimates from a public policy perspective, using Table 3 which 
presents the results on the effect of grants on unemployment reentry, we calculate a simple back-
of-envelope estimation of the amount of money spent per one job. In particular, as the effect of 
receiving a grant on not being unemployed after 24 months is 8 percentage points lower than 
the non-grant counterparts (Table 3, Column (4)), this implies that, on average, one would need 
to administrate 12.5 grants to have one unemployed less after 2 years. Since the average amount 
of self-employment grant is just above €3,200, the cost of one job is around €38,800 (95% con-
fidence interval is €26,250–€87,500). Our estimated public cost per job is higher than the costs 
found by Brown and Earle (2017; $21,580–$25,450) but are within the range of public cost per 
job identified by a recent review of 30 robust microeconometric impact evaluations of public 
grants for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU ( Dvouletý et al., 2021). The 
previous study shows heterogeneity of public costs of “€189,000, €62,000, €26,000, €14,700 and 
€6,000 per job” (Dvouletý et al., 2021, p. 14). Note, however, that our relatively high cost per one 
job might come from our implicit assumption. In particular, as we do not observe the number 
of employees in the unlimited liability dataset, we assume that one craft is one employee, which 
might not be the case. Therefore, the amount of €38,800 is actually per one unlimited liability 
firm, and hence the upper bound for the cost per one job. 
4 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of ALMP—self-employment grant—in Croatia in 
the period 2010–2017. The government provided startup grants for unemployed individu-
als to ease challenges during the first 12 months of business opening and thus: (i) directly 
decreasing unemployment via self-employment and (ii) indirectly decreasing unemploy-
ment by potential hiring of new entrepreneurs. Grant beneficiaries could open limited or 
unlimited liability firms and use the funds—which could go up to 50% of average Croatian 
gross annual salary—on entrepreneurs’ salaries and contributions, basic equipment, and 
training. While the funds allocated to this policy accounted for only around 5% of annual 
ALMPs funds, firms opened via this grant scheme accounted for up to 10% of newly opened 
firms throughout the years, giving this policy not only labor market activation, but also 
growth role.
Using four different and, arguably, rich datasets, we analyze whether these grants posi-
tively affect firm survival, firm growth, and individual employment possibilities. The results 
show that limited liability firms initiated through a grant have lower sales and employment 
growth, while the survival analysis, based on annual reports, reveals a worse survival profile. 
On the other hand, using much more detailed firm demography data, we find that unlimited 
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liability firms have higher survival compared with no-grant counterparts, even if a sizable 
portion of them closes after the required 1-year period. Using a quasi-longitudinal dataset of 
unemployment episodes, we find compelling evidence that individuals who exit unemploy-
ment with a self-employment grant have better chances of staying out of unemployment, which 
characterizes self-employment grants as an effective policy to advance labor market prospects 
of unemployed individuals. While heterogeneous effects indicate that a self-employment grant 
is particularly effective for individuals who became unemployed after inactivity and lost their 
job due to a firm’s closure—which indicated favorable activation potential of this policy, they 
also indicate that the longer the unemployment duration, the less effective the grant. Further-
more, the grant is more effective for individuals who would otherwise have access to labor 
market opportunities (men, more educated, prime-age workers, previously employed). Finally, 
our simple and conservative back-of-the-envelope calculation shows the public cost per job cre-
ated is about €38,800.
While this paper attempts to document the effect of self-employment grants on firm per-
formance and labor market reintegration in detail, a lot still needs to be understood, in this 
empirical setting, as well as in others. For example, the effects of variation in funds, the use 
of funds, and the duration of the measure all relate to the question of optimal design of the 
grant. Furthermore, the question of the political economy of grants remains an important one, 
since self-employment grants, as also shown in this piece of research, have an intrinsic tension 
between social and growth components.
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Appendix
A.1 Unemployment re-entry
Figure A1 Number of appearances of individuals in the entrepreneurial sample.
Figure A2 Kaplan–Meier estimates of employment survival: full  sample.
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Table A1 Results, unemployment re-entry: full sample
Full sample
Sample mean (1) (2) (3) (4) N
Not unemployed after













































Individual-based covariates No Yes Yes Yes –
Episode-based covariates No No Yes Yes –
Individual fixed-effects No No No Yes –
Note: The full sample consists of all unemployment episodes from January 1, 2009, until 
November 23, 2017, and finishing in employment. Individual-based covariates are gen-
der, age, education, tenure, all discretized according to Table 2. Episode-based covari-
ates include duration of the episode, reason for entering unemployment, reason of exiting 
unemployment, reason of employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, year of entering 
unemployment, and year of exiting unemployment, all dummies discretized according to 




Figure A3 Overlap of propensity scores before and after nearest neighbor matching.
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Table A2 Nearest neighbor matching and linear model
Matching Linear model
Sample mean (1) N Sample mean (2) N
Not employed after
6 months 0.877 0.010** 
(0.005)
21,404 0.768 0.023*** 
(0.003)
48,259
12 months 0.775 0.055*** 
(0.006)
21,404 0.652 0.066*** 
(0.004)
45,692
18 months 0.673 0.066*** 
(0.007)
21,404 0.577 0.052*** 
(0.005)
43,406
24 months 0.576 0.095*** 
(0.007)
21,404 0.515 0.057*** 
(0.005)
40,508
36 months 0.405 0.058*** 
(0.007)
21,404 0.416 0.020*** 
(0.006)
34,530
Notes: Estimates in the column “Matching” represent the average treatment effect on the 
treated obtained by the nearest neighbor matching. The selection equation is solved with 
a probit model containing covariates as in Table 3. Individual-based covariates are gen-
der, age, education, tenure, all discretized according to Table 2. Episode-based covariates 
include duration of the episode, reason of unemployment entry, reason of unemployment 
exit, reason of employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, year of unemployment entry, 
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Table A3  Results, unemployment re-entry: episodes by individuals with at least two 
 appearances in the dataset
Sample mean (1) (2) (3) (4) N
Panel A: Full sample
Not unemployed after













































Individual-based covariates No Yes Yes Yes –
Episode-based covariates No No Yes Yes –
Individual fixed-effects No No No Yes –
Panel B: Entrepreneurial sample
Not unemployed after













































Individual-based covariates No Yes Yes Yes –
Episode-based covariates No No Yes Yes –
Individual fixed-effects No No No Yes –
Note: The full sample consists of all unemployment episodes from January 1, 2009, until 
November 23, 2017, and finishing in employment. The entrepreneurial sample is a subset 
of a full sample containing all episodes of individuals who exited unemployment due to 
entrepreneurial reasons at least once. Individual-based covariates are gender, age, educa-
tion, tenure, all discretized according to Table 2. Episode-based covariates include duration 
of the episode, reason of entering unemployment, reason of exiting unemployment, reason 
of employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry sector, year of entering unemployment, and year 
of exiting unemployment, all dummies discretized according to Table 2. Standard errors 
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Table A4  Heterogeneous effects: COX PH model with the most comprehensive  specification













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (years)
≤20 0.645 0.518 0.803 0.870 0.672 1.127
20–30 0.426 0.389 0.466 0.611 0.550 0.679
30–40 0.434 0.397 0.475 0.662 0.596 0.737
40–50 0.450 0.405 0.501 0.594 0.524 0.673
≥50 0.533 0.459 0.619 0.718 0.599 0.860
Gender
Female 0.474 0.440 0.510 0.670 0.615 0.730
Male 0.438 0.409 0.469 0.621 0.573 0.673
Education
Elementary or less 0.608 0.515 0.717 0.742 0.613 0.899
High school 0.450 0.424 0.477 0.622 0.581 0.666
University or more 0.399 0.354 0.449 0.655 0.568 0.755
Potential tenure
≤2 years 0.431 0.368 0.504 0.635 0.529 0.764
2–5 years 0.430 0.369 0.502 0.654 0.545 0.783
5–10 years 0.429 0.383 0.480 0.651 0.569 0.744
10–20 years 0.431 0.394 0.471 0.604 0.544 0.670
≥20 years 0.510 0.454 0.573 0.670 0.584 0.769
Not applicable 0.532 0.454 0.624 0.751 0.620 0.909
Unemployment duration
≤30 days 0.150 0.071 0.315 0.260 0.122 0.553
30–90 days 0.356 0.314 0.404 0.514 0.444 0.594
90–180 days 0.382 0.342 0.426 0.513 0.452 0.581
180 days–1 year 0.455 0.415 0.499 0.649 0.582 0.725
1–2 years 0.551 0.494 0.614 0.796 0.696 0.911
2–3 years 0.636 0.523 0.773 0.853 0.665 1.095
≥3 years 0.576 0.443 0.748 0.820 0.574 1.173
Status before unemployment
Working 0.446 0.419 0.473 0.641 0.597 0.688
Education 0.613 0.507 0.741 0.853 0.674 1.078
Inactivity 0.400 0.361 0.443 0.583 0.515 0.660
Vocational training 0.592 0.324 1.083 1.390 0.592 3.260
Other 0.416 0.269 0.641 0.423 0.260 0.688
Employment exit reason
Not applicable 0.440 0.403 0.480 0.614 0.553 0.682
Expiration of contract 0.472 0.427 0.521 0.659 0.586 0.741
Expiration of seasonal contract 0.458 0.327 0.640 0.703 0.480 1.029
Dismissal (econ., tech., and org. reasons) 0.501 0.456 0.551 0.684 0.612 0.764
Dismissal 0.687 0.486 0.971 0.989 0.640 1.529
Worker resigned 0.407 0.286 0.580 0.539 0.343 0.845
Consensual resignation 0.339 0.271 0.424 0.516 0.395 0.674
Firm closure 0.358 0.249 0.515 0.366 0.246 0.545
Other 0.387 0.106 1.414 0.358 0.022 5.809
(Continued)
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Figure A4 Kaplan–Meier estimates of employment survival by years.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year of exit
2010 0.535 0.415 0.691 1.079 0.780 1.494
2011 0.606 0.527 0.697 0.847 0.717 1.000
2012 0.500 0.430 0.581 0.692 0.582 0.822
2013 0.461 0.422 0.503 0.705 0.628 0.791
2014 0.508 0.448 0.577 0.691 0.598 0.798
2015 0.451 0.386 0.526 0.577 0.483 0.688
2016 0.189 0.144 0.248 0.292 0.217 0.393
2017 0.023 0.006 0.091 0.037 0.009 0.151
Note: The full sample consists of all unemployment episodes from January 1, 2009, until November 23, 2017, and 
finishing in employment. The entrepreneurial sample is a subset of a full sample containing all episodes of individu-
als who exited unemployment due to entrepreneurial reasons at least once. All estimates include individual-based 
covariates are gender, age, education, tenure; and episode-based covariates include duration of the episode, rea-
son of entering unemployment, reason exiting unemployment, reason of employment exit, NACE 1-digit industry 
sector, year of entering unemployment, and year of exiting unemployment, all dummies discretized according to 
Table 2 (excluding a covariate we use to partition the dataset). Hazard ratio low and hazard ratio high represents 
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Figure A5 Heterogeneous effects: age.
Figure A6 Heterogeneous effects: gender.
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Table A5 OLS and Cox proportional hazard estimates of firm survival (unlimited liability firms)
Dependent variable (method)
Firms survive (OLS) Survival (COX PH)
6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 36 months Coefficient Hazard ratio
Grant received
0.089*** 0.148*** 0.069*** 0.049*** 0.015 −0.272*** 0.762
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) [0.696, 0.835]
Observations 61,241 56,384 51,758 48,029 40,997 61,953
R2 0.030 0.045 0.036 0.042 0.047 0.054
Note: The first five columns present the OLS estimate of the received grant effect on the corresponding indicator of 
firm survival (with an associated sample truncation). The sixth and seventh columns present results of the estima-
tion of the Cox proportional hazard model of the received grant effect on survival probability (the sixth column is 
coefficient, while the seventh is hazard ratio). All estimates include dummies for the NACE 2-digit industry sector 
of the firm, dummies for the county of the firm’s headquarters, and dummies for the year of the firm opening. 
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the NACE 2-digit level, while brackets contain a 95% confidence 




A.2 Unlimited liability firms
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Table A6 Descriptive statistics of limited liability firms
Grant No grant
M Median  SD M Median SD
Registered capita (in euro)
Sales (in euro)
1,444 1.333 7,178 6,166 2,667 29,202
t 13,225 5,245 27,698 26,134 5,383 56,868
t+1 35,641 16,234 71,016 103,409 24,615 522,825
t+2 45,859 19,620 108,306 137,826 28,229 816,707
Number of employees
t 1.321 1.000 1.230 1.341 1.000 2.689
t+1 1.529 1.000 1.629 2.201 1.000 6.154
t+2 1.633 1.000 1.784 2.618 1.000 9.596



















Sample size 4,154 42,182
Note: The sample consists of all new limited liability firms registered from January 1, 2010, 
until December 31, 2016. For brevity, we do not show NACE 2-digit industry dummies, dum-
mies for the county of the firm’s headquarters, dummies for types of firm legal forms, and 
dummies for the number of months that a firm was officially open.
A.3 Limited liability firms
